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Taking Note of Notes: Student Legal
Scholarship in Theory and Practice
Andrew Yaphe
What is legal scholarship? Having posed the question, there is a strong
temptation to follow the sensible example of Pilate and decline to stay for
an answer.1 Alternatively, one might canvass the attempts to answer that
question which have been propounded, much- or little-debated, and largely
ignored by a host of legal scholars.2 A consideration of the legal scholarship
on legal scholarship, however, reveals no consensus as to what it is or ought
to be.3 In the absence of any agreement at the level of theory on the nature
of legal scholarship, one might instead attempt to define it inductively by
looking at the contents of law reviews, the typical repositories of American
Andrew Yaphe is a law clerk on the Northern District of California. He would like to thank
Jordan Segall for his invaluable contributions to this article.
1.

See Francis Bacon, Essays 61 (John Pitcher ed., Penguin Books 1985).

2.

Scholarship about legal scholarship is itself legion. Fortunately, the content of that
scholarship is largely irrelevant to this article. Those curious to behold what prominent
legal scholars have to say about the nature of the enterprise could do worse than consult
a symposium on the topic. See, e.g., A Symposium on Legal Scholarship: Criminal Law,
Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 521 (1992).

3.

It has been argued that legal scholarship should stick to its traditional strength—i.e.,
doctrinal scholarship with a strong prescriptive component—either because that is what law
professors are best equipped to produce, or because that is what will be most “useful” for
judges and lawyers. See, e.g., Dennis Archer, The Importance of Law Reviews to the Judiciary
and the Bar, 1 Det. C.L. Rev. 229, 229-30 (1991) (arguing that academics would be welladvised to abandon their quest for the “abstract and the esoteric” and instead concentrate on
writing “eminently more useful” articles on “topics that confront judges and practitioners of
the law”). Against this, it has been argued that nontraditional interdisciplinary scholarship
has both practical value to the profession and independent theoretical importance. See, e.g.,
Richard Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 Mich. L.
Rev. 1921, 1927-28 (1993) (admitting that much interdisciplinary legal scholarship “is bad,”
but arguing that legal scholarship is significantly “enriched” by the best of it and that it
has “more practical relevance” than its detractors acknowledge). These articles only begin
to scratch the surface of the debate. Instead of providing yet more representative articles
to constitute evidence, if any is required, that there is a lack of consensus about what legal
scholarship should be, I direct the interested reader to a bibliography of law review articles
about legal scholarship compiled in 1998, which lists a huge number of works on the subject.
See Mary Beth Beazley & Linda H. Edwards, The Process and the Product: A Bibliography
of Scholarship About Legal Scholarship, 49 Mercer L. Rev. 741, 745-70 (1998) (compiling,
literally, hundreds and hundreds of articles about legal scholarship).
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legal scholarship.4 But even a cursory survey of the unruly sprawl of America’s
law reviews makes one thing clear: “legal scholarship” is whatever an author
manages to get published in a law review. And that, it seems, can be almost
anything. There are, after all, hundreds of law reviews, each of which has to
fill hundreds (if not thousands) of pages each year with . . . something.5 The
result: if you have institutional credibility,6 and if you turn out some number of
more-or-less-Bluebooked pages that you present to the law reviews of America
as a work of legal scholarship, your effort will likely be published somewhere.7
It is not for me to say whether the uncertainty about the nature of legal
scholarship is a good thing. Instead, I want to inquire about the nature of
student legal scholarship. Law reviews, after all, contain more than the effusions
of law professors, judges and other established figures in the legal profession.
One of the things that makes legal scholarship distinctive8 is that law reviews
4.

The caveat is important: this article has nothing to say about legal scholarship outside the
United States. In America, for better or for worse, “legal scholarship” is essentially “whatever
gets published in the law reviews,” as the law review article is the prevalent mode in which
scholarly ideas are disseminated. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Some Ways to Think About Law
Reviews, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1153 (1995) (noting that “law professors rarely write or have to
write books”).

5.

I know of no source that quantifies the precise number of currently active law reviews, though
the number is clearly large. To get a sense of what the exact number might be, I looked at
a website platform that enables authors to submit their work to law reviews, figuring that
if anyone would know the number, the keepers of the website would—after all, they are in
the business of seeking out venues for legal scholarship. At the moment, that source—the
ExpressO online delivery service—comprises more than 750 reviews. See ExpressO, Express
online deliveries to law reviews, available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/ (proudly
asserting that it offers a list of “750+ law school reviews” to which authors may submit their
manuscripts). Law reviews also vary widely in length. The behemoths publish between
2,000 and 3,000 pages of material per year, if not more: a recent volume of the Fordham Law
Review checked in at a whopping 3,200 pages. See Damien H. Weinstein, New York: The
Next Mecca for Judgment Creditors? An Analysis of Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 78
Fordham L. Rev. 3161, 3200 (2010) (wrapping up what must have been an exhausting year
for the Fordham editorial staff). By contrast, recent volumes of the FIU Law Review (to stay
only in the “F”s) have only run to a few hundred pages. See Christopher B. Carbot, The Odd
Couple: Stadium Naming Rights Mitigating the Public-Private Stadium Finance Debate, 4
FIU L. Rev. 515, 552 (2009) (bringing a close to what must have been a relatively unstressful
editorial year, compared to that endured by the Fordham students).

6.

I know of no empirical research on the types of authors who get published in law reviews.
Extensive impressionistic research (i.e., “lots of trolling through law reviews”) indicates that
if you hold a position of authority and want to see your thoughts in print, a law review
will cheerfully provide a forum for your work, no matter its quality. See for yourself, as any
examples I might provide would only enrage the authors and law reviews cited.

7.

This is an observation that I am hardly the first to make. See, e.g., Robert L. Bard, Legal
Scholarship and the Professional Responsibility of Law Professors, 16 Conn. L. Rev. 731, 740
(1984) (remarking that there are “so many law reviews clamoring for articles that anything in
sentences can get published somewhere”).

8.

“Baffling” is another word that comes to mind, if one is accustomed to other scholarly
disciplines. Let us just say that the American Journal of Sociology rarely publishes articles
written by second- or third-year sociology graduate students.
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publish works by students, who almost by definition are not yet experts in
the field.9 For many student authors, the writing and publication of a note10 is
one of the central tasks of their law school careers. The business of producing
a note is, for most students, an enormous investment of time.11 In addition
to being a remarkably labor-intensive enterprise, the note often will have (or
will be perceived to have) far-reaching consequences for the student. While
some students may regard the note as an end in itself—yet another law school
obligation to be dutifully discharged, then never thought of again—many
students regard it as a significant undertaking with important repercussions.
The note will often furnish its author with a writing sample, which will be used
when applying for clerkships or other post-law school jobs. At the least, the
note constitutes a resume line which (the student hopes) will prove attractive
to future employers.12
Given how much work goes into writing a student note, and how
consequential an endeavor it is for many students, the enterprise bears closer
9.

This is not to say that student-written articles are widely, or often, or even “more than
occasionally,” influential. Most of the work that has been done on student legal scholarship
has been devoted to assessing the “impact” of such scholarship; it has mostly concluded that
the impact is insignificant. See, e.g., Bart Sloan, What Are We Writing For? Student Works as
Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 221,
230-32 (1992) (looking at a sample of federal court opinions to arrive at the conclusion that
“federal courts do not consider student works a significant source of authority”). One survey
of “law review usage” in the early 1990s determined that student-written articles were found
to be “less useful” than “standard law review articles,” and “received middling ratings” from
judges, attorneys and professors. See Max Stier, et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions
for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1467,
1468, 1497 (1992).

10.

The nomenclature of student-written articles is a bit complicated. To simplify matters, I will
use the word “note” to refer to “a piece of legal scholarship which is written by a law student
and which aims to resemble law review articles written by law professors.”

11.

It is often said that a law review article takes “at least 150 hours” to write. See, e.g., Kevin
Hopkins, Cultivating our Emerging Voices: The Road to Scholarship, 20 B.C. Third World
L. J. 77, 83 (2000) (asserting that “most law review articles take the writer an estimated 150
hours to complete”). The source for this charmingly arbitrary figure is an article by Richard
Delgado, How to Write a Law Review Article, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 445, 448 (1986) (asserting
that “[m]ost law review articles take the writer at least 150 hours from start to finish”). For all
one can tell, Delgado grabbed that number out of the air. And even if it were a more or less
accurate estimate c.1986, it is impossible to say whether advances in technology since then
have made it less time-consuming to write law review articles (because so many materials are
available online) or more time-consuming (because so many materials are available online).
It is the notoriously steep investment of hours required to write an article that presumably
inspired the aphorism sometimes attributed to Nietzsche: “Man does not live to write law
review articles; only the Yale Law School student does that.”

12.

In a resume that may be crammed with relatively fungible “achievements,” a student-written
article is bound to stand out. The fact that a student managed to get into Phi Beta Kappa
as an undergraduate may be a commendable indication of academic achievement, but it is
not exactly a conversation starter. By contrast, an article affords extensive conversational
opportunities: “Oh, you wrote about X—interesting. What made you choose X as a topic?
What did you conclude about it? Etc., etc.”
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consideration than it seems to have received. Bear in mind that few students
have written any kind of publishable scholarship before law school. How, then,
are they to know what to do when confronted with the challenge of writing
a note? In other disciplines, apprentice academics learn the conventions of
scholarship in their field by immersing themselves in its scholarly literature
over years of graduate study. Such an approach isn’t available to law students,
for a number of reasons. For one thing, law students usually are taught out of
textbooks that, for the most part, contain snippets of appellate opinions. It
would be possible to complete three years of coursework in most American law
schools without reading a law review article in its entirety. For another thing,
as noted above, the genre of legal scholarship is—to say the least—an inchoate
one, consisting as it does of “whatever established legal scholars manage to get
some law review to publish.” Reading, say, a year’s worth of articles in a major
law review—if anyone could manage to plow through an entire volume—would
expose a student to a bewildering welter of approaches, but would hardly
provide authoritative guidance on how legal scholarship ought to be written.13
And yet the students write their notes, and the law reviews publish them.
How does this happen? How do law students decide what they will write
about and how they will approach their subjects? And how do law reviews
(which are, for the most part, edited by students) figure out which studentwritten works they will publish?14 This article attempts to provide two kinds
of answers to these questions.15 First, I look at several of the leading “guides
for the perplexed” that have been written to walk law students through the
process of developing a piece of scholarly writing. My assumption is that these
texts reflect mainstream opinion about what student scholarship ought to look
like. My further assumption is that these texts, as they become more and more
popular, are helping to shape that mainstream opinion, as fresh generations
of law students (in particular, law students who populate the editorial boards
13.

It would also take forever. Many law students complain, not without reason, that they
already have enough work on their hands. It is a bit much to suggest that “reading enough
law review articles to get a broad perspective on legal scholarship” should be added to their
already imposing roster of tasks.

14.

Amusingly, many law reviews inform students that their articles must be of “publishable”
quality to be published, but fail to provide any objective criteria by which an author could
gauge whether his work is up to snuff. See, e.g., Duke Law Journal, Membership, available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dlj/membership (advising prospective student authors
both that there is no “required format” for “substance or style,” and that “[n]o submission
will be selected if it fails to meet the Journal’s high [if unspecified] standard of ‘clearly
publishable quality’”).

15.

Any thorough approach to the subject, no doubt, ought to involve empirical survey work
aimed at finding out how student writers and student law review editors answer such
questions as “How shall I find a topic?” and “Is this student submission publishable?”
(At the least, by doing so one would get a decent overview of the range of conscious
rationalizations employed by law students when confronted with such issues.) I have not
taken that kind of approach. Also, it seems more than likely that such unquantifiable factors
as “informal faculty advice” and “sheer guesswork” play a huge role in the process. Without
knowing how to reckon with those factors, I have chosen to ignore them.
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of law reviews) adopt the guidebooks’ implicit normative visions of what
student scholarship should be.16 I looked at what appear to be the three mostrecommended sources: a book, Scholarly Writing for Law Students, by Elizabeth
Fajans and Mary Falk;17 an article on finding scholarly topics by Heather
Meeker;18 and Eugene Volokh’s book on academic legal writing.19
Although there is no consensus in academia as to what legal scholarship
essentially ought to be, the guidebooks tell their student readers a different
story. Each of the guides has a specific notion of what legal scholarship should
be. Each instructs its readers that they need to write a certain kind of note,
and that they should avoid writing notes in certain proscribed ways. For the
most part, it is unclear where the authors of these guides derive their notions
of “proper” legal scholarship, given that there is no agreement in academia
on that subject. Nonetheless, they present their views as if they were objective
truths. While law professors feel free both to write about almost anything they
please, so long as it is at least tangentially related to the law, and employ a wide
variety of approaches, these guidebooks attempt to force student authors into
a straightjacket. On the basis of the guides, one would assume that only a few
kinds of legal scholarship are acceptable.
It may be argued that few if any student readers take these guides at face
value, and that the extended critique of them that I will offer is akin to the
dubious practice of breaking butterflies upon a wheel. I do not think that is
16.

The earliest edition of any of the sources I will be examining appeared in 1995. See Elizabeth
Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Scholarly Writing for Law Students (West Pub. Co., 1st ed. 1995).
Since then, the book has gone through two additional editions, the most recent of which
appeared in 2004. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Scholarly Writing for Law Students
(West, 3rd ed. 2004) [hereinafter Fajans & Falk]. The other major book in the area, Eugene
Volokh’s, first appeared in 2003, and has recently gone into its fourth edition. See Eugene
Volokh, Academic Legal Writing: Law Review Articles, Student Notes, Seminar Papers, and
Getting on Law Review (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2010). It is unclear why such books have
only appeared in recent years. Perhaps it simply never occurred to anybody that there was a
market for them until the mid-‘90s. It is also unclear what, at this point, would prompt a new
contender to write a book in this field, meaning that the visions of student legal scholarship
presented in these texts may become increasingly hegemonic in the years to come.

17.

I looked at the most recent edition of this text: the third, from 2004. Fajans & Falk, supra note
16.

18.

Heather Meeker, Stalking the Golden Topic: A Guide to Locating and Selecting Topics for
Legal Research Papers, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 917 (1996).

19.

I looked at the third edition of this text, the most recent available at the time I began this
project. Eugene Volokh, Academic Legal Writing: Law Review Articles, Student Notes,
Seminar Papers, and Getting on Law Review (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter
Volokh]. Although I did not attempt any kind of thorough survey of the frequency with
which these resources were recommended, they appear to be standard. See, e.g., Linda Berger,
Thomas Jefferson Law Review, Writing a Note, available at http://www.tjeffersonlrev.org/
Resources/writingnote.htm (suggesting that the books by Volokh and Fajans & Falk are the
“most complete guides” to writing a note, while the Meeker article is “also helpful”); see also
Georgetown Law Library, Research Strategies for Seminar Papers & Journal Notes, available
at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/seminar_papers.cfm (listing those three sources,
and only those three, as “additional resources on scholarly papers”).

264

Journal of Legal Education

true. Clearly, there is a significant market for these guides: Volokh’s book, for
instance, has gone through four editions in its seven years of existence. That
market, I would argue, has emerged in response to a definite need. Again,
there is no reason that law students should know the first thing about how
to write serious legal scholarship. Nor is there any reason to think that law
students elected to law review editorial boards will have any real idea of how
they ought to evaluate the notes submitted to them. Given those conditions,
it would be surprising if law students did not grasp at whatever straws are
offered to them. It seems inevitable that many law students thus will absorb
the normative visions contained in these guides, accepting them as true and
complete descriptions of what legal scholarship is and ought to be. One of
my goals, then, is to persuade law students and law reviews that the normative
visions of “the note” offered by these guides are arbitrary and incomplete.
In the second part of this article, I move from a critique of the prescriptive
suggestions found in the guidebooks to an empirical analysis of the way
students actually write notes. For this part of the project, I examined a set of
350 student-written articles published in a total of 12 law reviews between 2006
and 2009. Half of the law reviews were publications of “elite” law schools,
while the other half were from “non-elite” schools.20 By surveying this sample
of student writings, I have been able to draw an overview of what recent law
students have chosen to write about and how they have approached the task
of writing scholarly articles.
The goal of this section was to learn more about what law students are
actually doing (or, in some cases, to learn more about what they are not doing).
I also wanted to see how closely the advice proffered by the major guides
tracked with the actual practice of American law students. In some cases, as
we will see, there is a rather close fit between what the guides counsel and
what students actually do. In others, there is a gap between current practice
and the advice found in the guides. This section demonstrates that, in some
ways, the practice of student writing is richer than a reading of the guides
would suggest. However, it also suggests that some of the guides’ advice—
in particular, I would argue, some of the most unfortunate aspects of their
advice—is being heeded by law students.21
20.

For an explanation of these terms, see infra note 101.

21.

There is a certain amount of fudging here, as there will be throughout the article, because
it is impossible to determine how much of a causal connection there is between what the
guidebooks prescribe and what law students produce. As I have argued, I think that some
influence is unquestionably exerted by the guides on the choices of law students. But it is
also surely the case that some of the advice offered by the guides is nothing more than an
accurate reflection of actual law student practice. I do not pretend to have a clear sense of
where the guides are dictating law student behavior and where they are merely, as it were,
“restating” it. Sometimes, I will use the gap between “the note in theory” and “the note in
practice” to indicate that student work is more full of possibility than the guides would
have their readers believe. At other times, I will use the closeness of fit between theory and
practice to suggest that the guides are having an effect on what students elect to do. These
are, of course, interpretive decisions. It would also be possible to argue, e.g., that the gap
between theory and practice indicates that the guides are being ignored by students.
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As we will see, the guides inform students that they need to produce
articles that are “interesting” and “useful,” without supplying much definition
(interesting to whom? useful for what?) to those maddeningly nebulous
adjectives.22 In the spirit of those vague exhortations, I will conclude this
introduction by suggesting that this article may prove interesting or useful
to two groups of people: law students and law professors. Students may
benefit from this article’s assessment of the advice offered in the leading
guidebooks. They may also be curious to know what their peers are actually
doing.23 Professors may benefit from this article’s critique of the principal
guides, if only to the extent that they may learn how they ought to qualify their
recommendations of those texts to anxious students. They may also be curious
to know what it is that their students have been doing over the last few years.
I. The Note in Theory: Three Conceptions of Student Legal Scholarship
In this section, I look at three of the most prominent guidebooks for student
writers.24 The critique I offer of these guides is, at times, severe. However, I
want to make clear that my analysis is limited strictly to one aspect of these
works: their tacit assumptions about what student legal scholarship “ought”
to be. If one brackets those assumptions, each of these guides contains a great
deal of sensible advice about how to write a note. For the most part, these texts
focus on the mechanics of the writing process. Much of what they have to say
about that process strikes me as extremely helpful, but my argument does not
touch on that aspect of these works. I am solely interested in outlining and
critiquing the normative vision of student scholarship presented in each of
these texts. But it would be a shame if students—on the basis of this critique—
were to conclude that these guides should be avoided altogether. My goal,
instead, is to help students recognize that none of these texts should be taken
as gospel for what student legal scholarship is. Each of the authors has a
contestable, idiosyncratic picture of student legal scholarship. My point, again,
is to remind students that they can accept these authors’ practical suggestions
on how to write a note without also embracing their normative view of what a
note must look like.
22.

See, e.g., infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.

23.

At the least, those with aspirations to be either conventional or unconventional may benefit
from a perusal of the empirical portion of this article. Conformists can mine the data
to construct a perfectly typical student work. Nonconformists can look at the areas and
methodologies that are largely ignored by other student authors and plan their projects
accordingly.

24.

Hardly any serious scholarly attention has been paid to these resources. To my knowledge,
only Ruthann Robson has devoted significant critical attention to these texts. See Ruthann
Robson, Law Students as Legal Scholars: An Essay/Review of Scholarly Writing for Law
Students and Academic Legal Writing, 7 N.Y. City L. Rev. 195 (2004). Robson’s central issue
with both Volokh’s and Fajans and Falk’s books is that they concentrate exclusively on the
supposed utility of the note to the note’s supposed audience, while saying nothing about
the student’s own passion for the subject. Id. at 198. As will become clear, I am sympathetic
to this line of critique.
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A. The Note as a Clerkship Writing Sample
The first guidebook for student writing that I will discuss is, perhaps, the
most popular: Eugene Volokh’s Academic Legal Writing. Volokh’s book opens
with a parable. In it, an illustrious jurist—Judge Alex Kozinski—reminisces
about interviewing a clerkship candidate who had “record-breaking grades”
from a “name-brand law school,” coupled with glowing recommendations that
praised him as a “Kozinski clone.”25 The interview, Kozinski relates, was going
splendidly, until the candidate made a nearly fatal blunder. When asked if
he had decided on a topic for his law review note, the excitable interviewee
proudly announced “It’s done’” and whipped out an “inch-thick document.”26
Kozinski was impressed—until he looked at the title page: “The Alienability
and Devisability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry.” Kozinski
tells us that his first thought was that the note’s title had to be a joke.27 Then he
wondered why anyone who was supposed to be “smart” would write “on such
an arcane topic.”28 Finally, he turned to the note itself. “It was well-written
enough,” he concedes.29 Nonetheless, “the effort was pointless”30 because “the
subject matter was of absolutely no interest to me.”31 Instead of reading the
note, Kozinski’s mind wandered off, as he mused darkly about what such an
“arcane” choice of topics could signify about the note’s author: “Under that
veneer of brilliance, was there a kook trying to get out? Could I really trust his
judgment as to the countless sensitive issues he would have to confront during
his clerkship?”32
Kozinski, we learn, never actually got around to reading “more than a few
lines” of the “dreary” paper.33 Despite his reservations, he decided to offer the
possible “kook” a clerkship, while making clear that he should “drop the paper
in the nearest trash can and start from scratch.”34 “I explained to him what was
wrong with it,” Kozinski relates, and told him “what a successful paper should
look like.”35 If, at this point, you find yourself worrying about how devastated
that poor kid must have been, rest assured that things worked out for him. He
“gratefully accepted” the advice, “chucked” his “inch-thick” note, and went
25.

Volokh, supra note 19, at 1.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. Kozinski does not explain why choosing to write about estates in land should be taken
as indicative of deep-seated “kookiness,” or why such a choice would indicate that a clerk
would be incapable of reading briefs, researching precedents or any other standard chores.

33.

Id.

34.

Id.

35.

Id. at 2-3.
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on to reap the rewards of his acquiescence to Kozinski’s authority: a Supreme
Court clerkship, high status in his profession as an “often quoted legal
academic,” and, we presume, happiness.36 “His name,” Kozinski portentously
concludes, “is Eugene Volokh.”37
Before we get swept away by this story of a career crisis narrowly averted,
it is worth asking exactly what was wrong with the note. Elsewhere in his
introduction, Kozinski offers criteria for gauging competence in student
scholarship: “Is the topic broad enough to be useful, yet narrow enough to be
adequately covered? Is it persuasive? Is it fun to read? . . . A well-written, wellresearched, thoughtful paper can clinch that law firm job or clerkship.”38 Did
Volokh’s note fail in these ways? We’ll never know. For that matter, Kozinski
couldn’t have known, since he was unable to bring himself to look at more
than a few lines of it.
What, then, was the problem? The note, Kozinski conceded, was wellwritten; at an inch-thick, it was probably well-researched. It may even have
been thoughtful. But all that effort was pointless, because the topic did not
immediately grab the attention of Judge Kozinski. The unspoken moral of the
story is clear: thoroughness, elegance and thoughtfulness are all very well, but
if your note fails to capture the attention of a member of the judiciary, writing
it was a complete waste of time.
As Academic Legal Writing makes clear, that lesson was thoroughly internalized
by Kozinski’s eager pupil. Indeed, the book reads as if it were designed to
inculcate and drive home what the young Volokh had learned: namely, that
impressing authority figures—in particular, a judge seeking clerks—is the raison
d’être of student legal scholarship. The book describes the task of student
scholarship and its audience in vague and confusing ways which are never
precisely spelled out. But, on reflection, it seems clear that Volokh is referring
only to judges and their desiderata. Much of his advice—though it seems
questionable or false when considered as a description of scholarship per se—
makes excellent sense, when seen for what it really is. At its base, Volokh’s
book offers advice designed to help avoid the likelihood that a judge will
be offended or irritated by a student’s work, in the way Kozinski was by the
young Volokh’s original note.
The vagueness of Volokh’s book is epitomized by its central commandment:
that student articles must be useful.39 No doubt this is true in some sense,
36.

Id. at 3.

37.

Id.

38.

Id. at 2.

39.

Id. at 17. To be precise, Volokh offers a definition of “good” legal scholarship in which
“usefulness” is just one factor. In full, he asserts that legal scholarship should “make (1) a
claim that is (2) novel, (3) nonobvious, (4) useful, (5) sound, and (6) seen by the reader to
be novel, nonobvious, useful, and sound.” Id. at 9. But most of this definition is either true
of all scholarship (in what field would “obvious” scholarship be considered “good”?) or
hopelessly indeterminate (in a society like ours, in which people hold deeply heterogeneous
beliefs, what does it mean to say that scholarship should be “sound”?). The only one of these
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but what exactly does it mean? Without specifying to whom student writing
should be useful and for what purposes it will be used, the advice is worthless.
Volokh explains that a useful article is one that “at least some readers can come
away from . . . with something that they’ll find professionally valuable.”40 But
this adds nothing to the definition, since saying “some readers” punts the issue
of for whom students should be writing, while “professionally valuable” lacks
specificity and continues to be unhelpful.
Without precisely explaining what he means by “usefulness,” Volokh ties the
term to a call for prescriptive scholarship. The most interesting notes, Volokh
asserts, “are often ones that combine the descriptive and the prescriptive.”41
Though he concedes that a student “can certainly write an article that’s purely
prescriptive or purely descriptive,” he says that “[c]ombining the prescriptive
and the descriptive . . . tends to yield a more interesting and impressive article.”42
To round out this string of unsupported assertions, Volokh emphasizes the
necessity of being prescriptive by asserting that “[p]ractical-minded people
who read a purely descriptive piece will often ask: ‘So what?’”43
Setting aside the vatic character of these pronouncements, they can be
boiled down to the claim that student scholarship should be addressed to
“practical-minded” readers, and that such readers generally (or, at least, often)
find that scholarship is not interesting or useful unless it is prescriptive. But
if we pause to reflect on these assertions, they seem dubious. Who, after all,
are these practical-minded readers? Volokh suggests, no doubt correctly, that
the audience for legal scholarship of any kind consists of lawyers, judges and
scholars.44 Which of these groups, however, is likely to find student scholarship
wanting if it is merely descriptive? Consider the uses that a practicing lawyer
is likely to make of a student note, assuming a practitioner has any use for it
at all. It seems likely that busy lawyers might turn to student scholarship for
an encyclopedia-like treatment of some slice of the law, rather than finding
edification or inspiration in a student’s bold proposals for legal or social
reform.45 The same, I suspect, goes for law professors. While it is possible that
some professors are eager to learn about and build on prescriptive proposals of
terms that could possibly have any specific pertinence to the aspiring legal scholar is the
concept of “useful.”
40.

Id. at 17.

41.

Id. at 11.

42.

Id.
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Id. at 19.
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Id. at 17.
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In my own experiences as a practitioner, I never used student notes for anything but their
descriptive analyses of an area of law. Notes, I found, were sometimes a convenient means
of getting an overview of a body of doctrine. I invariably ignored any proposals for social
or legal change that a note might include, as such proposals were invariably irrelevant to
my work. It is, of course, possible that my use of student notes was aberrant, though my
conversations with other practitioners suggest otherwise.
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their students, a more plausible professorial approach to student scholarship
is described by Robert Weisberg. He writes that the most useful student work
for academics is that which “generat[es] information and material, and . . .
synthesiz[es] this material in a way that the professor can use in a course or
in supporting the more speculative ideas in her own scholarship.”46 In fact,
Weisberg comments on the number of student papers that he has found
“enlightening and usefully exploitable,” even though they had been rejected
for publication because they were “merely descriptive.”47
All that remains are judges; and it is with them that we can finally see what
Volokh is getting at. The blend of descriptive and prescriptive work upon which
Volokh insists resembles nothing so much as an appellate judicial opinion. An
appellate judge, after all, cannot be content merely with description of the
facts found by the district court or the relevant lines of precedent: he must also
prescribe a result. Volokh, in effect, is telling students to write scholarship as if
they were apprentice appellate judges, mixing the descriptive and prescriptive
as an appellate judge must do. As Volokh offhandedly, but tellingly, remarks,
a purely descriptive piece will not seem good to a reader who is “looking
for a creative, original-thinking law clerk.”48 Although Volokh says that the
audience for student scholarship consists of a broad group of “practicalminded” readers in the legal profession, a closer examination of his normative
standards indicates that he really has just one reader in mind: the judge vetting
candidates for clerkships. But why should all student notes be tailored to the
requirements of that very narrow audience? Volokh’s unquestioned assumption
that the criteria for competence in student scholarship should be “whatever is
most calculated to appeal to judges as a writing sample” does considerable
harm to students who follow his advice. First, it does a disservice to those who
do not want to do that kind of work, but who find themselves compelled to
do so by law reviews that assume Volokh’s view is an objective description of
scholarship.49 Second, it does a disservice to scholarship itself, because it tends
to devalue any student work that does not look like an appellate opinion, no
matter how interesting or useful that work might be to readers who are not
judges.
In this light, it is instructive to consider a number of Volokh’s assertions
about scholarship which seem puzzling at first, but which make perfect sense
once one realizes that Volokh believes a good student note is, in essence, a
clerkship writing sample. Consider Volokh’s instruction that students “try
to include some arguments or examples that broaden [the] article’s political
appeal.”50 From a scholarly point of view, this advice is inexplicable. Much
46.

Weisberg, supra note 4, at 1151.

47.

Id.

48.

Volokh, supra note 19, at 36.

49.

For an apparent example of this kind of thing, see the discussion of the Santa Clara Law
Review, infra note 140.

50.

Volokh, supra note 19, at 21.
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legal scholarship, after all, need not have any political appeal at all, and
legal scholarship which does have political valence rarely bothers to attempt
a broad approach. (Imagine telling Richard Epstein that his latest article is
OK, but that he needs to make more of an effort to broaden the appeal of his
work to readers who don’t share his political presuppositions.) As advice to an
ambitious clerkship applicant, on the other hand, this makes complete sense.
A student who wants to enhance his chances on the clerkship market will be
well-advised to apply as broadly as possible to a wide ideological spectrum of
judges.51 As such, he will want to write a note that is unlikely to alienate any of
his potential judicial employers.
Similarly, Volokh attempts to dissuade students from making radical
arguments. He informs the potentially radical student author that if he “really
want[s] to make [a] radical claim, [he should] go ahead—[he] might start a
valuable academic debate, and perhaps might even eventually prevail. But,
on balance, claims that call for modest changes to current doctrine tend to
be more useful than radical claims, especially in articles by students.”52 Once
again, the term “useful” has to mean attractive to judges, who tend to be
dubious of anything that smacks of the “radical.” The same cautionary note is
struck in Volokh’s strong suggestion that students “avoid using jargon” that
will label their work as “belonging to some controversial school of analysis.”53
Thus, Volokh exhorts students to steer clear of “law and economics, literary
criticism or feminist legal theory,” unless they are “require[d]” to invoke such
approaches.54 For practical purposes, of course, this is tantamount to saying
“don’t employ theoretical perspectives.” Again, from a purely scholarly point of
view, this advice makes little sense: theoretical approaches and interdisciplinary
perspectives have become par for the course in legal scholarship.55 But judges,
notoriously, are less comfortable with such approaches.56 Volokh’s advice,
essentially, is to keep one’s eyes on the prize. Never mind what the law
professors are doing; focus instead on what judges are supposed to want.
51.

Or, at least, to as wide an ideological spectrum as exists among members of the American
judiciary: it is thus a good idea to make oneself attractive to both conservative Republicans
and moderate to right-wing Democrats.
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Id. at 20.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.
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See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317 (2002)
(observing that although doctrinal scholarship continues to be a huge part of legal
scholarship, “interdisciplinary scholarship looms very large,” and suggesting that such
interdisciplinary work may “come eventually to dominate academic law”).

56.

For the locus classicus of judicial dissatisfaction with non-traditional scholarship, see Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 34, 34-35 (1992) (complaining that many law schools have “abandoned their
proper place” by “emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and
pedagogy,” and asserting that judges have “little use” for much of the “abstract scholarship”
that is “now produced by members of the academy”).
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The most puzzling aspect of Volokh’s book is his consideration of one of the
most classic of note topics: the circuit split. On the face of it, this would seem
the perfect subject for a Volokhian note. For Volokh, after all, the student’s
mission when choosing a topic is to first identify a problem, and then generate a
“claim” which will constitute the student’s proposed solution to that problem.57
And, as we have seen, Volokh thinks that the best kind of claim is one that
will be of interest to a judge. Given those principles, a circuit split seems like
the beau ideal of a student note topic. Circuit splits, after all, are self-evidently
“problematic.” As Volokh observes, the fact that the split exists “shows that
there’s an important problem with no obviously right answer.”58 The student,
of course, can always argue that one or another of the views expressed by the
circuit courts ought to be adopted by all of them. Furthermore, circuit splits
seem highly likely to be of interest to judges, who will be curious to learn of a
split of authority that may affect their decision-making.
Yet Volokh, surprisingly, dissuades student writers from tackling the circuit
split. He writes that it is unfortunate that students commonly write about circuit
splits, and suggests that they would do better to avoid such notes.59 Volokh’s
stated rationale for this is, to say the least, perplexing. He cautions student
authors to eschew writing about splits because of the likelihood that their work
will be “preempted” when (or, more precisely, if) the Supreme Court resolves
the split.60 But why is that a problem? If a student starts to write about a circuit
split in October and the Court issues an opinion resolving it in November,
that would indeed be unfortunate. As Volokh says, the student in such a sorry
predicament would either have to “radically rework” his article or “throw it
out altogether.”61 But given the Court’s paltry caseload, and considering the
lengthy period over which many splits are allowed to percolate, this hardly
seems a fatal concern. It may be that Volokh is concerned that the Court will
resolve the split soon after the student has finished writing his note, making it
seem irrelevant. However, that seems an odd concern, given that timelessness
is not one of his criteria for a good student note. Nor could it be, as the threat
of getting preempted—i.e., the danger that a change in the law or society will
render one’s work irrelevant—is hardly unique to circuit splits. Any sociolegal
problem that is identifiable by a student is liable to fall by the wayside, or to
get fixed by a legislature or court in a way that renders the student’s work on
that problem uninteresting to future readers.62
57.

Volokh, supra note 19, at 12.
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Id. at 37.
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Id. at 36-37.
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Id. at 37.
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Id. at 36-37.

62.

For an amusing example of prescriptive, “problem-solving” notes that were effectively
“preempted by real life,” consider the spate of law review notes published in 1999 about
the wildly overhyped “Y2K problem.” See, e.g., David M. Kono, One Trillion Dollars? An
Analysis of Y2K Employment Implications for Attorneys, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 1529 (1999).
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The question remains: Why should Volokh be so dismissive of the circuit
split as a topic? The answer I propose is, admittedly, a counterintuitive one.
For Volokh, I would argue, circuit splits are too perfect a topic. By the logic
of Volokh’s argument, circuit splits are what all law students should be
writing about. Paradoxically, though, their very perfection as a Volokhian
topic threatens to expose the barrenness of Volokh’s vision of scholarship.
For Volokh, all student scholarship arguably aspires to the condition of “notes
analyzing circuit splits.” But, confronted with that prospect, Volokh recoils,
as if he realizes that there must be something wrong with a scholarly world
in which almost all student writers are churning out doctrinal analyses of
circuit splits coupled with facile, readymade prescriptive “solutions” to them.
Instead of embracing the logical consequences of his position, Volokh balks.
He concocts a spurious explanation of why circuit splits are a bad thing for
students to write about, while failing to see that they are in fact the culmination
of everything he advises students to do.
Volokh’s primer for student writers is, as I said, perhaps the most popular
guidebook. It is also, arguably, the most pernicious, as it insistently (if implicitly)
directs students to write notes that will be suitable for clerkship writing
samples, while discouraging students from writing anything that might rock
the boat intellectually or politically. Volokh advises students to be interesting
and useful, but upon closer inspection, those terms have very idiosyncratic
meanings. “Interesting,” it turns out, means “interesting to judges.” By the
same token, the word “useful” in Volokh’s book actually means “useful for
the purpose of establishing one’s bona fides as a judicial clerk.” Meanwhile,
any kind of scholarship that would not make for a plausible clerkship writing
sample is implicitly denigrated or explicitly cautioned against.
B. The Note as Solution to a Doctrinal/Policy Problem
The next guide to be considered is a 1996 law review article by Heather
Meeker that offers advice on how to select topics.63 Meeker’s article is perhaps
the most down-to-earth of the three texts under consideration. She does not
entice the reader with visions of the rich rewards that may accrue to the author
of a successful note.64 Instead, she conceives the task of writing a note as a
necessary chore, one of the hoops that law students have to jump through
to complete their legal education.65 This approach, at least, has the virtue of
forthrightness. For Meeker, writing a note is just one more thing a law student
is compelled to do. Even more than other aspects of law school, however,
63.

Meeker, supra note 18.

64.

Compare Volokh, supra note 19, at 5 (touting the plums that may fall into the lap of an author
of a “good student article,” including “jobs, clerkships, and . . . teaching positions,” not to
mention the possibility of having a “huge impact” on the legal profession), with Fajans &
Falk, supra note 16, at 4 (explaining to the student author that the “techniques and strategies”
developed while working on a note will be “relevant” to the development of the skills needed
to be a successful lawyer).
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Meeker, supra note 18, at 917.
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the project of writing a note is bewildering. As she puts it, the student who is
“commanded to find a research topic” is “faced with a daunting chicken-andegg problem,” because he “must do a great deal of research to assess a topic on
which to do research.”66 Again, this is refreshingly honest.
Having stated the challenge faced by law students in such unsentimental
terms, Meeker’s article offers students helpful guidance on how to locate note
topics. As she does this, Meeker propounds a normative vision (both explicitly
and implicitly) of what student legal scholarship ought to be. This vision is at
least partly derived from a survey of student-edited law reviews she conducted
in the 1990s.67 It is not apparent whether the article’s assumptions about
“proper” student scholarship are Meeker’s own, or reflect her research into
the opinions of contemporary law review editors. Regardless of their origins,
the article’s assumptions are worth considering, since they embody a typical
understanding of the nature of student legal scholarship.
“Law review articles essentially do one of two things,”68 Meeker says. First,
they “resolve jurisdictional conflicts of law applied to an existing factual
situation.”69 Second, they “apply existing law to new or newly defined factual
situations or apply new laws to existing factual situations.”70 And that, in
“essence,” is that. To paraphrase Dorothy Parker, this view of legal scholarship
suggests that law review notes may run the gamut of topics from A to B. A
student can do doctrinal work (resolving jurisdictional conflicts) or policy
work (applying law to factual situations). Other approaches, though conceded
to be within the realm of possibility, are marginalized.
Having set forth this narrow understanding of legal scholarship, Meeker
offers a series of suggestions for how students can find topics within one of those
two categories. The first of Meeker’s suggestions is the circuit split. Unlike
Volokh, Meeker embraces circuit splits as a note topic. She principally advises
that students should seek to resolve “jurisdictional conflict,” since topics in
this area are “the most amenable” to inexperienced legal researchers.71 And,
as she observes, the “most obvious breeding ground” of such conflicts is U.S.
66.

Id.

67.

Id. at 919. I say “at least partly” because it is not clear from the article how many of Meeker’s
suggestions are derived from her empirical research into attitudes among law review editors,
and how many are her own ideas. Meeker tells us that the core of her empirical project
was a survey of approximately 200 student-edited law reviews, in which she asked editors
“questions about how they approached operations and management, topic selection, and
preemption review.” Id. at 918-19. However, the survey itself seems in fact to have dealt only
with preemption review, suggesting that the article’s assumptions about which topics are
appropriate for student scholarship are largely Meeker’s own. Id. at 973-75.
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courts of appeal.72 Circuit splits, in Meeker’s view, have several advantages.
First, they have the advantage of “relevance.”73 Students, as novices to every
field of law, may find it difficult to know whether potential research topics
are worthwhile. Writing about a circuit split, Meeker suggests, means not
having to fret about whether one’s work is significant, because circuit splits
by definition are topical. Second, they have the advantage of being relatively
simple to identify.
Meeker then offers a section devoted to what I am calling policy analysis.
She does not define this area as well as one might like, but basically it entails
identifying new “factual backdrops” or “coming trends” and examining how
old or new laws apply to them.74 The advantage of writing on a topic of this
kind, Meeker indicates, is that “new facts” are constantly being churned out,
meaning that a wide variety of potential topics are always being generated.
However, while articles in this domain, by definition, will be timely, their
relevance is not as assured as is that of circuit splits. And to find a viable topic,
it is not enough to peruse treatises or monitor recent circuit court decisions.
The student must be slightly more creative.
The core of Meeker’s article is thus its assertion that law review articles
essentially do doctrinal or policy work, coupled with specific suggestions
about how a student can generate topics in those areas. Although the article
does concede that other kinds of topics are possible, it has no useful advice
to offer about them. Moreover, the terms in which non-standard topics are
discussed seem likely to deter law students from pursuing ideas outside
doctrinal/policy subjects. For instance, while Meeker acknowledges that
“there are other kinds of traditional topics available,”75 she warns readers that
articles on such subjects are “more akin to the papers that graduate students in
other fields write.”76 She then devalues such work by stating that these topics
may be better suited for a “student who is uncomfortable with traditional legal
analysis.”77 The implication seems clear: if you cannot do real legal scholarship
(the kind that law review articles “essentially” do), then maybe you can squeak
by with a piece on an outlier topic. Having thus cautioned students against
pursuing work in one of these areas, Meeker offers a rather arbitrary selection
of three categories of “other” topics: “historical law,” “legal philosophy and
jurisprudence,” and “case notes.”78 At no point does Meeker explain why she
chose those three as representative categories, nor does she explain them.
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Instead, she simply provides the titles of four randomly selected examples of
each type of note.79
After that arbitrary and unhelpful discussion of “other traditional” topics,
Meeker turns to what she calls “nontraditional” topics.”80 Again, Meeker
warns students about committing to work in these vaguely defined areas. She
cautions that nontraditional notes “have the disadvantage of requiring timeconsuming research going beyond the usual sources.”81 Having thus implied
that they are more work than they are worth, Meeker offers an odd typology
of the nontraditional that consists, in its entirety, of the following topics:
“original research” and “municipal law.”82
While Meeker’s article is somewhat haphazardly assembled, and while it
is certainly dated, it usefully serves up a typical vision of what student legal
scholarship ought to be. The vision is fuzzy and a bit hedged, but basically
comes down to this: students should be doing doctrinal/policy research of
the most garden-variety type, resolving circuit splits and examining statutes.
You can do other kinds of work, the article concedes; but the student is always
reminded that such work is time-consuming and marginal. By offering pages
of specific suggestions about how to do research in the “essential” categories,
while having nothing to say about the problems of pursuing topics in other
areas—indeed, while explicitly indicating that other areas are more trouble
than they are worth—Meeker reinforces the view that law students should
devote themselves to conventional topics.
C. The Note as Prescriptive Doctrinal/Policy Work (More or Less)
The final guidebook to be considered is Scholarly Writing for Law Students, a
text written by Elizabeth Fajans and Mary Falk, two professors of legal writing
at Brooklyn Law School.83 Upon initial inspection, Fajans and Falk offer the
most attractive—or, at any rate, the least constrained—vision of legal scholarship
of any of the three guides considered here. They begin by insisting that legal
scholarship “is increasingly pluralistic and lively, opening up to new voices,
new concerns, new disciplines.”84 Instead of starting from the premise that
student legal scholarship must be essentially doctrinal and policy-oriented,
they indicate that a variety of alternative approaches are available, including
“Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, Legal Storytelling, [and]
79.
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Feminist Jurisprudence.”85 While they acknowledge that student notes have
“traditionally tended to be less ambitious and theoretical” than articles by law
professors, they assert that “this seems to be changing.”86 Indeed, they appear
to advocate for a freedom of approach that would be entirely out of place in
the work of Volokh or Meeker, writing that “[l]egal scholarship allows that
free play of intellect and imagination out of which the future of a discipline
emerges.”87
Alas, this assertion that students, like professors, have the right to engage
in the “free play of intellect and imagination” is soon tempered. Fajans and
Falk almost immediately backpedal from their liberatory opening, as they
inform students that it is essential for them to understand that “almost all legal
scholarship is implicitly directed to the decision-makers in our society” and is
thus “characteristically normative (informed by a social goal) and prescriptive
(recommending or disapproving a means to that goal).”88 A mere page after
extolling the way legal scholarship is opening to “increasingly pluralistic
and lively” perspectives, they announce that “legal scholarship’s . . . core”
consists of “normative/prescriptive” work.89 This, finally, is the message of the
book, which offers a more sophisticated version of Meeker’s view that legal
scholarship is essentially doctrinal/policy work, combined with a less strident
version of Volokh’s view that student scholarship needs to be prescriptive.
Fajans and Falk instruct students that the “majority of legal scholarship
and almost all student scholarly work” fits into one of three categories.90
These, they write, are the “case cruncher” (i.e., doctrinal analysis of case law),
the “law reform” article that argues for changing a legal rule or institution,
and the “legislative note” that analyzes proposed or recent legislation.91 The
student is told that these “are the traditional modes of scholarship, and work
in them is the most appreciated by judges and practicing attorneys.”92 As an
afterthought, Fajans and Falk acknowledge that interdisciplinary or empirical
studies “might be appropriate” for some students, but they make clear that
such work is avoided by “almost all” students and is not “most appreciated”
by judges and practicing attorneys, who are, after all, the people to whom
students will be looking for jobs.93 While recognizing that scholarship in
other disciplines is not “characteristically normative and prescriptive,” they
state flatly that, in the law, a “purely descriptive or interpretive approach” will
85.
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“rarely be successful.”94 Oddly, they neglect to explain how the student is to
square this advice with the praise of interdisciplinary scholarship with which
their book opens.
In general, the book vacillates between the authors’ sense that there is
more to legal scholarship than prescriptive doctrinal/policy work and their
sense that it would be irresponsible to encourage students to be too daring in
exploring alternatives to such work. For example, they counsel students not
to be “too timid in your choice of subject, especially if you have a theoretical
bent,” suggesting that there may be a surprisingly broad audience eager to get
fresh perspectives on various issues.95 But in the same breath, they discourage
students from attempting such notes, stating that “[c]ourts and practitioners
are especially grateful for practical articles: practitioners read articles looking
for litigation strategies, and judges read articles seeking perspective on the
cases before them.”96 The latter advice, one suspects, serves to cancel out the
former. The moral seems to be: you shouldn’t be too timid, but you must
always remember that it pays to be conventional.
For the rest, the book offers advice that will seem familiar after our
examinations of Volokh and Meeker. Fajans and Falk advise students to select
their topics with a view to “writing a paper that expresses original, useful, and
timely ideas about an important subject.”97 As generic advice, this is as vague
and unhelpful as the comparable injunctions we saw in the other guidebooks.
After all, if students knew enough about the law and legal scholarship to know
what an original or useful scholarly idea might be, they would hardly need
the guidance of one of these texts. And when Fajans and Falk get down to
particulars, their advice is, again, familiar. The student is told, for example,
that a topic “might be original if it identifies for the first time a new issue, a true
problem in the law that needs fixing.”98 And, as with Meeker, the most obvious
example of such an original topic is “a ‘split’ among the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals.”99
The best one can say of the book is that it is less in thrall to a narrow and
constraining set of presuppositions than the other two texts. Fajans and Falk
expound the view that legal scholarship “characteristically” takes a normative/
prescriptive, doctrinal/policy orientation, but they do not go out of their way
to insist that students obey that imperative. Nor do they imply that judges
will want nothing to do with you if you disappoint them by writing on an
unconventional subject in a non-traditional manner. This approach—arguing
that prescriptive articles on doctrinal/policy topics are at the core of student
94.
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scholarship, without actively belittling alternatives or discouraging students
from trying something unusual—is, at least, the most unfettered vision of
student scholarship on offer.
II. The Note in Practice: Student Scholarship, 2006-2009
Having surveyed what student writers are being exhorted to do, we can
proceed to consider what they are actually doing. This, to my knowledge, is
uncharted territory: I know of no previous attempt at an empirical analysis
of student scholarship. To begin to fill that gap, I looked at a representative
sample of 350 student notes: every note published between 2006 and 2009 in
twelve randomly chosen law reviews. By examining this sample of notes, we
can get a sense of what recent law students have chosen to write about, and
discover how students have actually approached the task of writing a scholarly
article.
A. Description of the Methodology
Choice of Reviews. To get a broad picture of student work, I decided to look at
student writing from both “elite” and “non-elite” institutions. As my arbiter of
“eliteness,” I turned to the perhaps inevitable U.S. News & World Report rankings
of law schools.100 Flagship law reviews from schools ranked in the top 14 were
deemed elite; flagship law reviews from schools ranked between 60 and 100
were deemed non-elite.101 Six law reviews from each group were selected at
random.102
100. The rankings employed were the 2010 edition. See U.S. News & World Report, Rankings—
Best Law Schools, available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/rankings [hereinafter USNWR rankings]. The
rankings have shuffled somewhat over the last five years, but they did not change much. Yale,
for instance, was the “best” law school in the country that entire time (as it will be in saecula
saeculorum, presumably). Use of the USNWR rankings as a crude proxy for status should not
be taken, of course, as an endorsement of the oft- and aptly criticized rankings. Critiques
of the rankings abound. For one thorough assessment of the harms caused by the rankings,
see Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and
Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 Ind. L. J. 229 (2006).
101. By relentlessly deploying scare quotes around any form of the word “elite,” I intend to signal
a certain skepticism of the concept. I make no assertions about the difference in quality
between any of the law schools, law reviews, student writings or student authors considered
in this article. The term is meant to serve as shorthand for one of the realities of life in the
legal profession, a reality that can perhaps be summed up by observing that a move from
a school ranked around No. 80 in the USNWR rankings to one ranked around No. 7—
whether for a transfer student, an upwardly mobile professor changing jobs, or a scholar
seeking to parlay the acceptance of an article into a placement at a more prominent journal—
would be widely regarded as a coup. Having, I hope, sufficiently indicated my skepticism of
the concept, I will stop enfolding the word in quotation marks every time I use it.
102. The pool at the non-elite end is larger because some flagship law reviews in that range do not
publish student scholarship in appreciable quantities. A law review had to publish at least
12 notes within the three-year period to qualify for the study; otherwise, I skipped it and
moved on to another randomly chosen review. For instance, the Chapman Law Review was
originally to have been considered, but it only published ten full-length student comments

Taking Note of Notes

279

The elite schools selected were Yale (1), Stanford (3), Columbia (4),
Michigan (9), Virginia (10), and Northwestern (tied for 11). The non-elite
schools were Miami (tied for 60), Oklahoma (tied for 72), Chicago-Kent (tied
for 80), Hofstra (tied for 86), Santa Clara (tied for 93), and West Virginia (tied
for 93).103
Choice of Student Writing. A number of different kinds of student writing
appear in law reviews. Some student-written pieces are full-fledged works of
scholarship, essentially equivalent to articles written by law professors. These
are labeled “notes” by some law reviews, while other reviews refer to them
as “comments.”104 Other student-written pieces are intended as commentaries
on a single case. Confusingly, these are also referred to as either notes or
comments. The bulk of student-produced scholarship falls into one of these
two categories, though there are occasional exceptions—a few law reviews still
occasionally publish student-written book reviews, for instance.
For purposes of this study, I focused solely on what I am calling “notes.”
I wanted to see what students produced when they were emulating their
professors and attempting to write full-length scholarly articles on topics of
their own choosing.105 Thus, I eliminated anything that was clearly intended to
be a “casenote” or “case comment.”106 I also eliminated anything in which the
choice of topic appeared to be dictated by the requirements of the law review
itself—e.g., student pieces that were on a pre-selected symposium topic.107
Description of the Sample. For each law review selected, I looked at all of the
student notes published in three consecutive volumes between the 2006-2007
in the relevant volumes.
103. While the top schools tend to be scrupulously differentiated, ties abound as one goes further
down the USNWR rankings: thus, seven different schools are ranked No. 86.
104. To minimize confusion, I will refer to full-blown student-written articles as “notes”
throughout this section.
105. I am aware that this is an oversimplification: the percentage of students who select a topic of
their own choosing is, to say the least, unclear. At least some law professors provide readymade topics for students. I have not done any empirical research to determine how common
it is for students to accept a topic handed to them by a professor (or to determine whether
such behavior is more common at elite or non-elite law schools), though at least one wellregarded source of advice for student writers takes the phenomenon for granted. See Meeker,
supra note 18, at 931 (observing that “some professors produce lists of topic ideas for their
classes,” and suggesting that students in search of a topic may request to see such a list).
106. Or, at least, I eliminated anything that a law review itself labeled as such. Some law reviews
simply bunch all the student scholarship together in a single section: the West Virginia Law
Review, for instance, employs the basic division of “Articles” (by law professors, practitioners
and judges) and “Student Works.”
107. For instance, the April 2007 issue of the University of Miami Law Review was devoted
to a symposium on the Terri Schiavo case. It includes three student notes inspired by the
case. Similarly, each volume of the Santa Clara Law Review includes a student-written note
reviewing developments in legal ethics over the previous year. None of these were considered
as part of this study.
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and 2008-2009 academic years.108 The sample included a total of 350 notes. Of
those notes, 201 appeared in elite law reviews, while 149 appeared in non-elite
law reviews.109
B. What Are Students Writing About?
In this section, I examine the areas of substantive law on which students
have chosen to write, comparing the choices made by students at elite and
non-elite schools. I also look at several particular subjects for student writing:
circuit splits, Supreme Court case law and local issues.
1. Substantive Law
As we have seen, one of the difficulties for law student writers is choosing a
topic, inasmuch as few students have significant experience in any area of law.
Our overview of student writing begins, accordingly, with a look at the areas
of substantive law students select as topics. I have categorized notes according
to the major field or fields of substantive law addressed in the note. Where
possible, I paired the note with a standard law school course into which its
subject matter fit. To pick easy cases: a note proposing an amendment to a
federal trademark law was categorized as “Trademark Law”; a note on the
Confrontation Clause and how several Supreme Court cases would affect the
admissibility into evidence of certain kinds of documents was categorized as
“Evidence Law.” If a note seemed to straddle two different substantive areas, I
placed it under two headings. For instance, a note analyzing the “conflicts that
can arise between patent and antitrust law” in the context of reverse payment
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry was categorized as both “Patent
Law” and “Antitrust Law.” And, if a note seemed to address a completely sui
generis topic that would be difficult to fit into a standard law school course,
I allowed it to stand alone. Thus, a note on “outer space law” that aimed to
“reveal some of the major legal obstacles currently constraining the space
industry” was placed in an “Outer Space Law” category.110
108. Many law reviews publish issues to correspond with the academic year. Thus, the first issue
of a given volume will appear in autumn, and its last issue will be published the following
summer. In other cases, a given volume of a review is published entirely within a single year.
In the case of the first kind of review, I looked at the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009
volumes. In the case of the second kind of review, I looked at the 2006, 2007 and 2008
volumes. There was one exception: during the time-span under consideration, the Santa
Clara Law Review switched formats. Thus, Volume 46 of the Santa Clara Law Review goes
from 2005 to 2006, while Volume 47 appeared solely in 2007. I looked at its 2005-2006, 2007
and 2008 volumes.
109. For a fuller version of this section of the article, including additional tables and more
data on the notes being considered, see Andrew Yaphe, Taking Note of Notes: Student
Legal Scholarship in Theory and Practice, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1711533.
110. See Gabriele Wohl, Outer Space, Inc.: Transmitting Business, Ethics, and Policy “Across the
Universe,” 111 W. Va. L. Rev. 311 (2008). Outer space law, alas, is an underwritten field; no
other note touched on this interesting area of the law.
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Commentary on the Overall Distribution of Subjects. The most interesting discovery
is that no one topic is overwhelmingly popular. Outside of constitutional
law, no subject area attracted more than 8 percent of students from elite law
schools, while no subject attracted more than 8 percent of students from nonelite schools.
Favored by Elite Students, Shunned by Non-Elites. The major disparity in subject
area choice came in the area of civil procedure and federal courts. Civil
procedure, of course, is a core course, one that is taken by all American law
students. Federal courts is also a standard course, widely regarded as essential
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for students who aspire to clerkships in the federal judiciary. It is unsurprising
that this area attracted the second-most notes among elite students. However,
it was almost completely ignored by non-elite students. There were zero notes
in non-elite law reviews on topics in federal courts, while there was only a
single note on a topic in civil procedure.111
The disparity in notes on federal courts (which was the subject of 11 elite
notes, as against zero non-elite notes) may be accounted for by the fact
that more elite than non-elite law students expect to secure federal judicial
clerkships after graduation. However, while this may explain why non-elite
student authors show little interest in the mechanics of the federal court
system, it does not explain why so few of them appear to take an interest in
civil procedure per se.
Favored by Non-Elite Students, Shunned by Elites. Perhaps the most notable subject
area that is favored by non-elite students and largely ignored by elite students
is property law. It was the fourth most-popular subject for non-elite notes,
accounting for seven percent of the total.112 By contrast, only four of the
elite notes (two percent) were on property law. This disparity becomes more
significant when the elite notes on property law are examined more closely.
Three of those elite notes were empirical analyses of aspects of property
law in local communities. These notes, in their methodological approach
and conceptual stance, were all strongly influenced by the work of Robert
Ellickson.113 In other words: if it were not for property law notes written under
the aegis of Ellickson, there would hardly be any elite property law notes at
all. Non-elite notes, by contrast, tended to deal with such property topics as
takings doctrine, the partition of real property and zoning law. Such topics
were essentially unaddressed by elite law student authors in the sample.
The other major area that is popular among non-elite students but ignored
by elite students is family law. This was one of the more popular subjects for
111.

See Jill Holly, The Circuit Split Over the Citizenship of National Banks for Diversity
Jurisdiction Purposes Under 28 U.S.C. § 1348, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 205 (2005).

112. Admittedly, five of the ten non-elite student notes on property law came from a single
institution: the West Virginia Law Review.
113.

Two of these notes were by Yale students who worked with Ellickson; one was by a
Northwestern student who was evidently influenced by Ellickson’s work. See Tad Heuer,
Living History: How Homeowners in a New Local Historic District Negotiate Their Legal
Obligations, 116 Yale L. J. 768, 768, 814 (2007) (thanking Robert Ellickson personally
for “his extensive comments, assistance, and encouragement,” and conducting empirical
research whose “results are consistent with Ellickson’s research on the interplay between
law and social norms”); Valerie Jaffee, Private Law or Social Norms? The Use of Restrictive
Covenants in Beaver Hills, 116 Yale L. J. 1302, 1302-06 (2007) (contributing to “debates over
the interaction between public and private methods of land use coordination” in which
Ellickson has been one of the major figures and thanking him personally for his “invaluable
assistance”); Laura H. Nirider, In Search of “Refinement Without Exclusiveness”:
Inclusionary Zoning in Highland Park, Illinois, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1919, 1919-20 (2008)
(declaring its intention to contribute to a debate about inclusionary zoning that was started
by Ellickson).
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non-elite students—the sixth-most-popular topic, in fact—but was completely
ignored by elite students.
The disparity of notes on property law may reflect the status of the course
in American law schools. The course tends to be underemphasized at elite law
schools (at Yale, for instance, students are not required to take it), while getting
more attention at non-elite law schools (perhaps because it is one of the central
subjects tested on the bar exam). Perceived status may also account for the
disparity of notes on family law, as it seems likely that fewer elite than non-elite
law students take a serious interest in the subject or anticipate practicing it.
Largely Ignored Topics. Perhaps the most surprising discovery of the survey was
that there were virtually no notes on contract law. Contracts is a course that
every law student in America takes in the first year of study. Most of the other
core first-year classes were well-represented in the sample, but contract law was
virtually unexplored. A total of three notes in the sample were on contract law:
one in an elite law review, two in non-elites. It is not at all clear why students
would avoid this topic. All law students are exposed to the area; many of them
will work with contracts in their careers; and it is not obviously less attractive
than many of the other topics students choose to write about.114
Another significant absence is notes on tax law. Tax, while not a required
course in most law schools, is still a major subject that many law students
take. However, only one note in the entire sample was on tax.115 It may be
argued that tax is a highly technical subject, and that scholarship on the topic
is likely to seem arcane or parochial to law students who lack special training
in the field. But the same could be said of other areas that are much better
represented in the sample. Patent law, for instance, is also highly technical, but
it was substantially better represented, with a total of 13 patent law notes: eight
in elite reviews and five in non-elites.
Given the number of law students who pursue corporate law for a career,
the relative paucity of notes in that area is perhaps surprising. Only five
notes—three in non-elite reviews and two in elite reviews—dealt directly with
the subject. However, if one includes other topics that fall within the broader
penumbra of corporate law, the area appears better represented.
Another subject that is relatively underrepresented, given its importance,
is administrative law. Only five notes dealt with that area. This appears
surprising, inasmuch as it seems likely that many more law students will
pursue careers that will require grappling with administrative law than, say,
wills and trusts (a topic that attracted basically as many student writers as
administrative law).
114. It is possible that contract law is more heavily “theoretical” than other core topics, and that
students who lack a background in economics therefore avoid it. This hypothesis seems
inadequate to account for the lack of work in the area, however, as law students are not
incapable of doing work in the theoretical discipline most pertinent to contracts—namely,
law and economics. Fifteen notes in the sample employed that methodology.
115.

See Patricia B. Hsue, Lessons from United States v. Stein: Is the Line Between Criminal and
Civil Sanctions for Illegal Tax Shelters a Dot?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 903 (2008).
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One conclusion that may be drawn from the relative absence of notes
in these central areas is that student writers, in their selection of topics, are
not strongly influenced by considerations of the work they intend to do in
their legal careers. Consider that contract law, tax law, corporate law and
administrative law combined were the subject of 14 notes. Compare that to
the representation of international law, which was itself the subject of 25 notes.
It is hard to imagine that many American law students will pursue careers
that do not involve at least one of the former subjects in a significant way. By
contrast, relatively few students will need to have expertise in any branch of
international law in their careers.
This survey may also raise questions about the alleged utility of notes to the
profession at large. Consider the popularity of constitutional law as a topic
for note writers. While it may be unsurprising that so many student writers
would be drawn to constitutional law for their topics, it is also the case that
constitutional law is, to say the least, also a popular subject for law professors
to write articles on. There are few areas in constitutional law that have not
been the subject of extensive commentary by law professors. But when there
are so many professor-penned articles to choose from on, for example, the
constitutional right to an abortion, why would anyone turn to a student
author’s work on the same subject?116
2. Circuit Splits
As we saw, there is something of a split among the guidebooks for student
writers when it comes to the topic of circuit splits. While Volokh strongly
cautions students against writing on circuit splits, Meeker regards them as
the most natural of subjects (and, not incidentally, one of the easiest topics
to come across).117 Fajans and Falk have less to say on the subject, noting only
that a note on a circuit split is the “classic example” of a work addressing
“disputes about law.”118 They encourage students to think creatively about
splits—suggesting, for instance, that students also look to conflicts among
state courts—but do not attempt to dissuade students from doing this kind of
work.119
Having listened to the advisors, let’s see what the students have actually
been doing.
116. This is not to say that student authors may not have compelling reasons to choose a topic
such as “the constitutional right to an abortion.” Nor is it to say that student authors are
incapable of writing work that is as good as, or even better than, professorial offerings. But
if we are to accept the claim that practitioners and judges are using student work, we have
to ask: are they really likely to use a student note on an area of constitutional law, when they
could just as well consult an article written by a prominent constitutional law scholar?
117.

See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.

118. Fajans & Falk, supra note 16, at 15.
119. Id.
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Table 1: Notes on Circuit Splits (Elite Notes)
Law Review
No. of Notes
Columbia
4 (8.5%)
Michigan
7 (18%)
Northwestern
2 (7%)
Stanford
0 (0%)
Virginia
3 (9%)
Yale
0 (0%)
Table 2: Notes on Circuit Splits (Non-Elite Notes)
Law Review
No. of Notes
Chicago-Kent
3 (11.5%)
Hofstra
3 (11%)
Miami
0 (0%)
Oklahoma
3 (23%)
Santa Clara
4 (12%)
West Virginia
2 (6%)
Overall, 8 percent of elite notes, and 10 percent of non-elite notes, dealt
with circuit splits.120
The most interesting aspect of this finding is how uniformly circuit splits
appear as a topic in elite and non-elite law reviews. One might have thought
that students at elite law schools would regard “tracking a circuit split” as
a banal task. Alternatively, one might have thought that non-elite students
would be less interested in generating original scholarly ideas, and thus would
turn to circuit splits as a crutch more often.121 In fact, however, elite and nonelite law students select circuit splits as a topic with nearly equal frequency.
Without a baseline for comparison of these figures, it is impossible to
determine whether notes on circuit splits are a dying breed, or whether they
have always been represented in roughly these proportions. The data may
indicate that most law students have consciously decided that writing on
circuit splits is a poor idea. Alternatively, law review editorial boards may have
largely decided that notes on circuit splits are unpublishable. But without
historical figures for comparison, it would be premature to interpret this as
evidence that Volokh’s dismissive opinion of the value of the circuit split as a
note topic has permeated the consciousness of American law students.
120. In total, 16 of 201 notes from elite law schools analyzed a circuit split, compared to 15 of
149 non-elite law schools. I performed a chi-square test of goodness-of-fit to test the null
hypothesis that notes considering circuit splits were equally common in elite and non-elite
law reviews. I do not reject the null hypothesis, χ2(1, N=350) = 0.47, p = .49.
121. To be clear: I do not hold such a clichéd view of law students at any level. These thoughts are
strictly presented as what one might believe, if one were inclined to stereotype law students
based on the status of their institution.
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3. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
For a broader picture of what law students were writing about, I looked
at whether notes included any extensive discussion of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. It perhaps goes without saying that, for many law students,
the Supreme Court holds endless fascination,122 and thus may influence
students’ choices of topic. It may be that students assume that writing about
Supreme Court opinions ensures that their work will be important. It may also
be that this belief draws students away from areas where the Supreme Court
has little to say (e.g., contract law) and toward areas where Supreme Court
pontifications are more central (e.g., constitutional law).
In some areas, of course, paying heed to Supreme Court opinions is
unavoidable. To choose an obvious example, it would be difficult to write
a note on a recent Supreme Court opinion and its consequences without
engaging in analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence. There are also wide
areas of the legal landscape which cannot adequately be treated without
consideration of Supreme Court precedents. But there are also any number of
legal topics for which no reference to the Supreme Court is necessary. Without
leaving the core subjects that all first-year law students are exposed to, it is
possible to deal with large swathes of tort, contract and property law without
so much as glancing at a Supreme Court opinion.123 The same goes for a host
of other subjects, including wills and trusts, corporate law and international
law. And, even in an area like constitutional law, it is in theory possible to write
a note on state constitutional law that would not need to cite U.S. Supreme
Court decisions.
For this portion of the analysis, I looked at whether notes included an
overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence in any area. A note had to offer at
least a page of in-depth analysis of one Supreme Court opinion, or at least
two pages of analysis of a series of Supreme Court cases, to be included in this
category.
Table 3: Notes Considering Supreme Court Jurisprudence
(Elite Notes)
Law Review
No. of Notes
Columbia
35 (75.5%)
Michigan
24 (63%)
Northwestern
18 (62%)
Stanford
8 (44%)
Virginia
23 (72%)
Yale
25 (68%)
122. Of course, it is not just law students who hang on the Supreme Court’s every pronouncement,
no matter how confused or vatic. Law professors, for instance, are not immune to that state
of mind. It might even be argued that the former phenomenon is a consequence of the latter.
Federal judges, obviously, have professional motivations for paying close attention to what
the Court does.
123. See, e.g., basically any casebook on these subjects.
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Table 4: Notes Considering Supreme Court Jurisprudence
(Non-Elite Notes)
Law Review
No. of Notes
Chicago-Kent
12 (46%)
Hofstra
12 (43%)
Miami
7 (47%)
Oklahoma
5 (38.5%)
Santa Clara
13 (39%)
West Virginia
13 (38%)
My analysis found that 66 percent of all elite notes included a close
consideration of Supreme Court jurisprudence, while only 42 percent of nonelite notes did so. Again, without a baseline it is impossible to say how many
notes making extended reference to Supreme Court opinions there “should”
be.
The most interesting aspect of this finding is that there was a significantly
greater proportion of notes examining Supreme Court cases in elite law
reviews.124 The significance of this is unclear. However, it may suggest that
Volokh’s views about the true purpose of the note resonate with elite law
students more than those at non-elite law schools.125 After all, elite law students
who want to use part of their note as a clerkship writing sample may think
it prudent to have at least one section deal with Supreme Court cases, even
if the analysis is not necessary, because they may think that federal judges
will be disposed favorably to writing samples that analyze Supreme Court
precedents.126
124. This difference is highly significant, χ2 = 20.92, p < .001.
125. By using the word “resonate,” I mean to tiptoe (yet again!) around questions of causation.
I assume that the vision of the note as a clerkship writing sample is not original to Volokh.
Rather, I take it that his book incarnates a set of assumptions about the purpose of student
scholarship that, at the least, is not uncommon among ambitious elite law students. (On the
other hand, I assume that Volokh’s views are, to some extent, the cause of student attitudes,
inasmuch as at least some students presumably have no notions whatsoever of what the note
is supposed to be and simply accept the guidance proffered by an “authoritative” source
such as Volokh’s book.) To the extent that this finding is indicative of support for Volokh’s
theory of the note, it may simply demonstrate the extent to which Volokh’s way of thinking
about notes is prevalent among elite and non-elite law school students.
126. Since law review articles tend to be such baggy monsters, it is somewhat difficult to look at
any given note and clearly identify a section that does not belong, but has been shoehorned
in for instrumentalist reasons. For one possible example of this phenomenon, see Katherine
Twomey, The Right to Education in Juvenile Detention Under State Constitutions, 94 Va.
L. Rev. 765, 767, 779-84 (2008) (arguing that “children in juvenile detention have a right to
an adequate education based on state constitutional guarantees of education,” but devoting
an entire section to discussion of several Supreme Court cases and concluding that “it is not
likely that juvenile delinquents will have a strong federal claim to challenge the inadequacy
of education provided in juvenile detention centers under the Equal Protection Clause or the
Due Process Clause”) (where “it is not likely” is a mild way of making an observation that
could be phrased “there is not a snowball’s chance in Hell that such a claim would succeed,
based on the unequivocal holdings in some very well-known Supreme Court decisions.”).
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4. Local Issues
The final category I considered was what I term “localism.” I wanted to
learn whether law students took an interest in writing about the world that is
immediately around them—i.e., legal issues at the city or state level—or whether
they thought it essential to address a problem that is not “merely parochial.”127
Volokh, for instance, explicitly discourages student authors from addressing
local topics. He suggests that articles focusing on a single state’s law will
generally be “useful only to people in that state,” and accordingly argues that
students should not “limit” themselves by writing on such topics.128 Instead, he
encourages students to find states with similar laws and frame their work as a
general discussion of “laws of [that] sort.”129
By “local,” I refer to a note that centers explicitly on an issue of state or
local law. Such a note might examine a state statute, or compare aspects of
one state’s law with that of another. Such a note might also examine a single
county or city, though notes zeroing in on governmental entities at that level
are rare.
One might hypothesize that such topics would prove less attractive
to students at elite law schools—law schools that think of themselves as
“national”—than they would be to students at non-elite law schools, which
often are characterized as “regional.”130 Such a hypothesis is strongly supported
by the evidence. Only 1.5 percent of elite notes addressed local issues, while 25
percent of non-elite notes did so.131 The disparity becomes even sharper when
127. At this point, I should confess to a certain bias (if the bias is not already obvious). I see no
reason why law students should not be writing on issues of local concern. (No scholarly
reason, anyway.) Areas such as municipal law and housing law, though little explored in
the note sample, could be treated profitably by student authors. Inasmuch as students are
deterred from working in these areas by assumptions that student notes should avoid being
“parochial” or “limited in scope,” those assumptions strike me as unfortunate.
128. Volokh, supra note 19, at 35.
129. Id. This is yet another example of Volokh’s incoherent approach to “usefulness.” After all,
an article that directly addresses a specific state law in, e.g., West Virginia is likely to be
quite useful to a lawyer in West Virginia who has to deal with that law. In fact, such an
article is likely to be more useful to such a lawyer than a general discussion of similar laws.
Again, Volokh’s counsel against localism may be explained by reference to his constant
presupposition that any note should resemble a good clerkship writing sample. (A note
entirely addressing a West Virginia law might be of interest to a West Virginia state judge,
on this view, but will be less likely to appeal to the broad spectrum of judges the clerkship
applicant is supposed to have in mind.).
130. For an article that uses these terms in a standard sense, see William D. Henderson, The
LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprising and Undertheorized Role of
Test-taking Speed, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 975, 1000-05 (2004).
131.

A huge percentage of the non-elite school local notes—21 of 37—came from just one law
review: West Virginia’s. Among other things, this suggests that the category of “non-elite
school law review” is a crude one, which could be broken down into at least two subgroups:
non-elite school law reviews that model themselves on elite school law reviews, and those
that do not. The student authors published by the West Virginia Law Review, for instance,
appear to regard the treatment of their state’s legal issues as one of their central missions:
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one observes that we have already encountered the three elite notes on local
issues: they are the Robert Ellickson-inspired studies of local communities and
property law mentioned earlier. With the exception of that very specific subset
of notes, no elite writers focused their attention on local concerns.132
This finding could be interpreted in a number of ways. It may be that there
are no elite notes on local issues because elite students do not care about
“parochial” problems.133 Alternatively, it could be the case that elite students
are deterred from writing on local issues because they have been told that
student legal scholarship should address more “important” subjects. It could
also be the case that elite students are, in fact, writing papers on local issues,
although their law reviews decline to publish such work as notes, on the
assumption that published notes must pertain to topics of “broader” interest.
C. How Are Students Writing?
Having looked at what law students choose to write about, we now can
turn to considering how they approach the task of writing a note. As we have
seen, the leading guidebooks exhort students to produce doctrinal/policy
scholarship with a strong prescriptive component. In this section, I look at
whether law students are heeding this advice. In the first subpart, I look at
students’ choices of methodology: whether they have elected to write doctrinal
and/or policy scholarship of the type advocated by Volokh, et al., or whether
they have branched off to do the kind of “nontraditional” work that is subtly
(or explicitly) discouraged by those authors. In the second subpart, I take up
the prescriptive question and see whether law students have chosen to adopt
the normative tack that the guidebooks tell them is essential to a good note.
1. Methodology
The notes in the sample were divided into four categories: doctrinal, policy,
doctrinal/policy, and “anything else.” The doctrinal note is one that looks strictly
at case law—what Richard Delgado has termed the “case cruncher.”134 I use the
term “policy” to designate a note that considers a piece of legislation, a social
institution, or another non-doctrinal subject, without using any identifiable
62 percent of West Virginia notes centered on local (almost invariably state-level) problems.
Their notes suggest a close attention to matters of local concern, which is absent both from
other non-elite law reviews (no Hofstra student, for instance, showed any special interest in
New York law) and from elite law reviews published by state universities (no Michigan or
Virginia students showed any special interest in their states’ particular legal problems).
132. The difference in the distribution of notes examining local issues is highly statistically
significant, χ2 = 46.05, p < .001.
133. The evidence of the Ellickson elite school notes on local communities, at least, suggests
that law students from elite schools can indeed take an interest in such matters, if properly
inspired. Local government law is, after all, a course that is offered at elite law schools. Some
students even find it interesting.
134. See Delgado, supra note 11, at 446.
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methodological approach (such as law and economics).135 “Doctrinal/policy”
notes are exactly what they sound like: a blend of doctrinal analysis of case
law with policy considerations. “Anything else” notes were, simply speaking,
anything other than one of those three. It is a catch-all category that includes
law and economics, history, empirical scholarship and other approaches.136

135. In some ways, this was a negative category. I used this term to designate notes that did
not do substantive doctrinal analysis, and which did not employ any other significant
methodological approach (e.g., law and economics, or empirical research, or history).
136. If a note included at least a single part that diverged from the standard doctrinal and/or
policy conventions, I categorized it as “anything else.” See, e.g., Mollie Lee, Environmental
Economics: A Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 Yale L. J. 456 (2006)
(featuring a part that offers standard-issue doctrinal discussion of cases interpreting the
Commerce Clause, followed by a part that offers a theoretical “market failure approach” to
describe environmental harm).
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The dominant category for notes, at both the elite and non-elite schools, is
the doctrinal/policy blend—a note that mixes consideration of case law with
broad policy concerns. As the tables show, such notes were equally popular
among elite and non-elite students, with just under half of each group electing
to take that approach. The pure doctrinal note was also equally popular for
students at elite and non-elite schools. About one in five students from each
group elected that approach.
It is interesting, however, to observe that students at all levels are prepared
to eschew the suggestions of the guidebooks and produce interdisciplinary
scholarship, and that some law reviews are willing to publish them. Elite law
reviews appear to be more hospitable to such work than non-elite law reviews.
A quarter of elite school student notes ignored convention and adopted a
non-standard methodological approach. Only 11 percent of non-elite school
student notes did the same. And certain elite law reviews are clearly more
comfortable with interdisciplinary work than others. The majority of students
at Stanford, and a plurality of students at Virginia and Yale, attempted nonstandard methodologies. This was not the case with the other elite law reviews,
nor with any of the non-elite law reviews.
Classification of Non-Standard Notes. Only 17 of the non-elite school student
notes fell into the catch-all “anything but doctrinal and/or policy” category.
Of those, six employed a comparative law approach, three employed a law and
economics approach and two were essays on legal history. None of the nonelite school student notes attempted any kind of original empirical research.
The other six used a variety of unusual methodologies (unusual, that is, for
student notes), including feminist theory, narrative and even music theory.
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By contrast, 53 of the elite school student notes fell into the “anything
else” category. Of those, history was the most popular methodology: 16 of
the notes were classified as legal history. Law and economics was the secondmost-popular methodology, constituting 12 of the elite school student
notes. Comparative law accounted for four elite notes. Eleven of the notes
included original empirical research. The other ten notes employed a variety
of approaches, drawing on such disparate fields as game theory, “pain theory”
and rhetorical analysis.
Analysis. Students from non-elite law schools appear to favor conventional
methodologies more than those from elite schools. One possible explanation
for this is that a higher percentage of students from elite schools receive
graduate training in other disciplines before law school, and thus believe
they are more capable of doing advanced interdisciplinary work.137 Another
possibility is that students from non-elite schools are less likely to have their
own opinions about what legal scholarship can or should be, and are more
willing to accept the prescriptions about doctrinal/policy work found in the
leading guidebooks. Yet another possibility is that those students are writing
more unconventional notes than is reflected in the sample, but non-elite law
reviews (and their student-run note selection boards) are less willing than elite
law reviews to countenance such work as publishable student scholarship.
2. Prescriptivism
As we have seen, the one consistent message beaten home by the guidebooks
is that legal scholarship needs to be prescriptive. Volokh tells students that to
be interesting their note needs to include a prescriptive element, and cautions
them that readers will dismiss their work with a “So what?” if they write a merely
descriptive note.138 Fajans and Falk declare that “normative/prescriptive” work
is the core of legal scholarship, and warn students that “purely descriptive
or interpretive” notes will “rarely be successful.”139 Do law students, in fact,
adhere to these precepts?
To answer this question, I categorized notes according to whether they
included a prescriptive component. If a note instructed anyone—courts in
137.

I did not attempt a thorough analysis of this, as it is not always easy to tell whether a student
author has an advanced degree other than a J.D. (Some law reviews conventionally offer
an introductory paragraph in which the reader is given biographical information about the
note’s author, including educational pedigree. Other law reviews do not.) I attempted a
quick comparison of two of the law reviews that do provide biographical data about student
authors. Eleven of the Yale student authors (30 percent) claimed to have graduate degrees
other than a J.D. Five of those 11 attempted something other than doctrinal/policy work.
By contrast, only two of the Chicago-Kent authors (8 percent) made such a claim. Both of
those authors stuck to standard doctrinal/policy work, however. Chicago-Kent students, as
a group, did not adhere to any fixed convention in their biographical entries. Many of them
did not even name the school where they did undergraduate work, a lapse of which no Yale
author was guilty.

138. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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general, one court in particular, Congress, an administrative agency, a foreign
country—that they needed to do something, I counted it as a prescriptive note.
Overall, 77 percent of elite notes included a prescriptive proposal, while
80 percent of non-elite notes did so.140 Of the 350 notes considered in this
study, 274 instructed some group of decision-makers on what they should do.141
The most popular addressee for these proposals was courts, generically—87
elite notes told courts what they ought to do, as did 23 non-elite notes.142 The
Supreme Court was singled out less often: only eight elite notes and nine nonelite notes had the temerity to instruct the highest court in the land on what
it needed to do. Congress was exhorted to take action in 35 notes: 13 elite
notes, 22 non-elite. Federal agencies received their fair share of advice as well:
among the agencies given instruction on what to do were the Food and Drug
Administration, the Federal Communication Commission and the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Addressees who were, perhaps, even less likely to
140. One reason that the percentage of prescriptive non-elite school notes is so high is that
every Santa Clara note included a prescriptive element. This seemed a bit surprising,
until I noticed that each Santa Clara note in the sample adhered rigidly to the same fivepart format: beginning with an “Introduction,” each moved on to sections providing
“Background,” “Identification of the Problem,” “Analysis,” and a concluding “Proposal.”
Given this uniformity, I presume that this rubric is mandatory for Santa Clara students who
wish to publish a note. (I can only “presume,” as the editorial board at Santa Clara declined
to respond to my query about their law review’s requirements for notes.) This procrustean
approach can have inadvertently humorous consequences, as when a note about a circuit
split—a case in which the problem is inherent in the title of the piece—still includes the
seemingly mandatory part offering “identification of the problem.” See, e.g., Holly, supra note
111, at 218 (explaining, under “Identification of the Problem,” that the note’s titular circuit
split “creates uncertainty”). The apparent necessity of including a prescriptive proposal
in every note produces even more bizarre results. Perhaps the strangest note in the Santa
Clara sample is one that offers an interesting descriptive overview of arbitration law in
China, before taking an abrupt left turn into unfettered prescriptivism by insisting that the
Chinese government must radically restructure its judiciary and institute a federal court
system based on the American model, to “facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards.” See
David T. Wang, Judicial Reform in China: Improving Arbitration Award Enforcement by
Establishing a Federal Court System, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 649, 667-78 (2008) (helpfully
suggesting, inter alia, that China could make do with only ten Courts of Appeals, each of
which would have jurisdiction over three provinces).
141. It is perhaps needless to say that these normative proposals, almost without exception, paint
a rosy picture of how the world would be improved if only the pertinent decision-makers
took action in the proposed manner. As Pierre Schlag has aptly remarked: “Indeed, when
was the last time you saw a law review article end on the note, ‘Oh my god, there’s nothing
we can do. We’re ruined.’?” Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank
Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 Geo. L. J. 803, 823
(2009).
142. Non-elite school notes were more likely to address particular courts. For instance, six of
the West Virginia notes contained prescriptive proposals that were specifically addressed to
West Virginia state courts. See, e.g. Allison Minton, One Man v. The “800-Pound Gorilla”:
An Argument for Truly Just Compensation in Condemnation Proceedings, 111 W. Va. L.
Rev. 503, 528-29 (2009) (arguing that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals should
“seize” a “timely opportunity” to settle a discovery issue, and instructing it to “lay down new
common law” for West Virginia).
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take heed of proposals made by American law students included the European
Union, Hamas, the Chinese government, the World Trade Organization and
emerging democracies looking to design “constitution-drafting processes.”
In addition to considering prescriptivism, I categorized notes according
to whether they sought to identify a problem that needed to be solved.
Eighty-three percent of elite notes and 88 percent of non-elite notes took that
“problem-based” approach.143 For the most part, this datum overlapped with
prescriptivism: if a note took a prescriptive slant, then it likely conceived of
itself as identifying a problem to which its prescriptive suggestion was the
solution. However, the overlap was not perfect. There were a number of notes
that identified a problem (and thus fell into this category), though the author
did not feel the need to propose a prescriptive solution of his own.144 There
were also notes that adopted a prescriptive approach, even though the author
had not identified a problem that needed fixing.145
III. Conclusion
At the end of an article that has had cutting things to say about the
assumption that legal scholarship “must” be prescriptive, it might seem (to put
it mildly) inconsistent of me to offer any prescriptions of my own. And, to tell
the truth, a normative peroration in the grand style (“Listen to me, decisionmakers who may or may not pay attention to law reviews, much less student
notes! You must do the following”) does not much appeal to me. Instead, I
will wrap up by offering a few theoretical observations.
It seems to me that there are at least three possible theories of the note.
For ease of reference, I will call them the utility theory, the instrumentalist theory,
and the scholarly theory. (I know I’m putting my thumb on the scale with that
last bit of terminology, but so what? At this point, the reader presumably is
not unaware of my own inclinations and biases.) We have seen the first of
these over and over again: it is the ostensible view propounded by the guides,
which constantly hammer home the claim that notes must be useful to some
readership. We have also seen the second of these. It is, in my argument, the
actual theory held by Volokh. It suggests that the true purpose of notes is to
advance the author’s career. However, we have not really seen the third theory
at all. I will attempt to explain what I mean by it, but first I want to offer a few
last observations about the other two theories.
143. That is, 166 of the 201 elite school notes, and 131 of the 149 non-elite school notes.
144. See, e.g., Andrew Carlon, Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State, 93 Va. L. Rev.
1081, 1086 (2007) (arguing darkly that the practice of entrapment in criminal law turns the
state into a “totalitarian punishment machine”—which is, presumably, problematic—without
offering any prescriptive proposals).
145. This is a rarer phenomenon, but examples do exist. See, e.g., Timothy A. Johnson, Sentencing
Organizations After Booker, 116 Yale L. J. 632, 665-66 (2006) (instructing “Congress,
lower federal courts and the Sentencing Commission” not to take action to change the
organizational guidelines for sentencing because the law does not need to be fixed, the
Supreme Court having correctly provided courts with “pragmatic flexibility”).
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On its face, the utility theory is highly appealing. For one thing, it has the
merit of appearing not to require any justification. “Of course scholarship
needs to be useful,” one might reasonably think. What else should it be? As
we have seen, however, this theory relies for its plausibility on the repeated
invocation of a few magic words, such as interesting and useful, whose content
is never quite supplied. But in the absence of any evidence about who in the
profession is reading notes and how they are using them, this theory, for all its
superficial allure, must be regarded as vacuous.146
There is also something to be said for the instrumentalist theory. For
instance, it has the great virtue of being practical. Given that the average law
student is likely to devote hundreds of hours to the task of writing a note, this
theory at least has the merit of explaining why it is worthwhile to do so. It
does not rely on vague, unsubstantiated assertions about how the profession is
relying on student scholarship. Indeed, under this theory, the profession could
be entirely indifferent to student scholarship: the note would still have value,
inasmuch as the student would still get something out of it. If we are being
honest with ourselves, we have to admit that we have no idea how, or whether,
the profession is employing the thousands of student notes published annually.
But we do know that students are making use of their notes to further their
own careers, by packaging them as writing samples and highlighting them on
their resumes.
Both of these are consequentialist theories of the note. On these accounts,
what matters is the real-world impact of the note on either the profession or
the student’s prospects. But framing the issue in those terms helps to point
up what is missing from both theories: namely, any sense that student legal
scholarship could possibly be a mode of disinterested inquiry, whose object
is to get at a hitherto undiscovered truth about some subject.147 This is not a
146. This may be as good a place as any to say a word about citation counts. Volokh begins
his book by arguing, solely on the basis of citation counts, that student notes can “have
a huge impact,” a claim he supports by listing a double handful of notes that have been
cited in a number of “academic works” and judicial opinions. Volokh, supra note 19, at 5-6.
But to simply adduce a raw number of citations as evidence of “impact” is, to say the least,
disingenuous. As any academic knows, the mere act of citing a text is in no way an indication
that one has been impacted by it. To see what I mean, imagine that I had chosen to cite
Professor X’s “An Article on Notes” in the course of writing this piece. I might have had any
number of reasons for citing X’s work, only one of which would be “X’s enormous impact
on my thinking.” Perhaps X dug up some helpful nugget of fact, and I decided that the most
convenient way of alluding to that fact was by citing its appearance in his article. Or maybe
it is the case that only a handful of other scholars have written on the topic of student notes,
and I found it necessary to throw in a cite to X to demonstrate familiarity with the relevant
literature. Or maybe I think that X is dead wrong about notes, and I decided to cite to him
as a minatory example of what not to think about them. Those are all prominent motivations
for citing anything, though observing as much tends to take the shine off the assertion that
being “cited by over 90 academic works and over 25 cases” is a strong indicator of “impact.”
Id. at 5.
147. I do not mean to sound starry-eyed about the purity of the academic enterprise, nor will
I bother assembling a footnote full of shallow references to descriptions of the scholarly
vocation in Western thought. Instead, I simply suggest that “notional usefulness to a
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vision of scholarship that one sees much of in the student guides to academic
writing. It is, however, a possible theory of the note—the theory that I am
calling (prejudicially, and for lack of a better word) the scholarly theory. On
this view, students might try to find an area of the law that genuinely interests
them. Instead of scouring conventional sources to locate a topical subject,
they might try to figure out what it is they think about whatever area of the
law matters to them. Having done so, they might write up the results of their
inquiry in whatever form seems most appropriate.
What, exactly, would be wrong with conceiving of the note in this way? I
can think of at least two objections. First, and most cynically, it may be argued
that many law students fail to find anything in the law to be passionate about.
In a way, this is one of the more distressing tacit messages of the guides. They
often seem to envision a student reader who is not excited about any aspect
of the law, and who therefore requires extrinsic devices to expose him to a
problem that he can “solve” in one of the expected ways. In defense of the
guides, it might be said that they are not designed to help the passionate law
student. Rather, they are aimed at the confused or indifferent law student who
is compelled to write about something, regardless of personal investment. That
may well be true, and it may be that the critique here should be addressed to
the law schools and law reviews (which require students, even if they have no
interest in scholarship, to write a “publishable note”) rather than to the guides,
which are merely trying to help students make the best of a bad situation.
I think that there is something to be said for this line of argument. In
response, I would say that if the guides explicitly confined themselves to that
purpose, I would have few objections to them. But they don’t. Instead, they
purport to tell all students what “good legal scholarship” is, which—for reasons
this article has been devoted to expounding—strikes me as deeply problematic.
Another, and perhaps more persuasive, objection is that what I am
describing may be all very well in some settings, but is unimaginable as a
general regime for producing acceptable student legal scholarship.148 It may
be said that students are indeed frequently passionate about one or more areas
professional audience” and “actual usefulness in advancing an author’s non-scholarly career
pursuits” would not generally be thought to constitute an exhaustive definition of the value
of scholarship.
148. I should perhaps observe that there is an obvious elitist version of this argument (here, I use
the word “elitist” in the invidious sense). On this argument, it may be said that students at
top schools can be allowed to go where their scholarly inclinations lead them, but students
at lower-tier schools need to be guided with a heavier hand if they are to produce competent
scholarly work. Having looked at hundreds of elite and non-elite school student notes in
the last few months (here, I use the word “elite” in the neutral sense), I would suggest that
this argument is belied by the reality of student scholarship. Many of the most interesting
and inventive notes appeared in non-elite school law reviews. By contrast, many of the
notes published in elite law reviews were formulaic or intellectually dubious. Of course, it is
possible that some of those “interesting and inventive” non-elite notes were in fact heavily
guided by the invisible hand of a faculty member. It is also possible that some of the authors
of formulaic or dubious elite school notes would have produced even worse work if they had
been left to their own devices.
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of the law, but translating that passion into adequate scholarship is, by and
large, beyond them. I am sympathetic to this position, having turned out my
own share of sketchy student papers. But, once again, the problem here is
that the objection assumes that we know what “adequate” scholarship is. If
we actually had a concrete idea of which features of student scholarship are
useful to the profession at large, then one might argue that the problem with
letting students follow their own inclinations is that they would thereby tend
to produce notes that fail to exhibit those useful features. But, as I have said,
we simply do not know how the profession uses student scholarship, assuming
that the profession does use it in a serious way. And, because we do not know
that, we cannot know that embracing the scholarly theory of notes would lead
to worse notes than we currently have.

